Ab de Buck & Caspar ten Dam

4 October 2022, Dordrecht, the Netherlands 

Somewhat to our surprise and relief, the elections in Bosnia on October 2 have yielded gains for politicians who stand for innovation and solutions across ethnic lines. However, this encouraging outcome is overshadowed by a misguided, even scandalous intervention by the High Representative, who oversees Bosnia on behalf of the international community. At the last minute, on election night (!), he introduced an amendment to the electoral law that strengthens the position of a Bosnian-Croat ethno-nationalist party, with support from Croatia.

This erroneous decision and behaviour by the High Representative could contribute to further stagnation in Bosnia and increase the risk of secession, by Bosnian-Croat and/or Bosnian-Serb nationalists in particular. This danger underlines the urgent need to replace Bosnia’s current constitution, which is too much based on ethnicity, with a truly democratic constitution based on citizenship and the ‘one man, one woman, one vote’ principle.

As we argued in two earlier articles about Bosnia (one early this year and one recently) [1], we believe that the Netherlands should insist on a much more alert and vigorous policy on Bosnia by the EU in particular. We specifically advocate four steps:

• Political pressure on the High Representative to actually fire extremist politicians;
• Express disapproval of the High Representative’s decision to amend the electoral law in favour of an ethnic-nationalist party;
• Realise the – already promised – additional troop contributions to the EUFOR Althea force;
• Inquiry at the International Court of Justice about the legal validity of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

Elections in Bosnia

Bosnia has three overarching presidents, who take turns in the role of presiding president of the country: a Bosniak, a Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Serb. In the last elections of October 2, two moderate candidates, a Bosniak and a Bosnian Croat, won a presidential seat for the first time. [2] An ethnic-nationalist hardliner, Zeljka Cvijanovic, has been chosen from among the Bosnian Serbs. Her buddy Milorad Dodik was narrowly elected president of that ‘their entity’, the so-called Republic Srpska. A dangerous outcome, as Dodik and his companions are openly working towards the separation of Srpska from Bosnia and its merger with Serbia. This may sound nonconsequential, but in practice it will mean that non-Serb residents will be bullied out through intimidation and violence. It is vital to take into account such secession by the use of force; it is quite telling that Srpska, under Dodik’s leadership, quickly decided to set up its own small army and its own judiciary. Tens of thousands of people who have returned after the war will be expelled again when such a secession transpires, until an ‘ethnically pure’ Serbian area emerges.

Bosnia’s complicated state structure goes back to the war in the early and mid 1990s. This stems from the Dayton accord, which was concluded in late 1995 under pressure from the US, Russia and Europe after the war. Under this Dayton Peace Agreement the country is divided into two entities, the Federation and Srpska. In the latter, Bosnian Serbs hold the positions of power. Above the two federations, there is a ‘High Representative’ installed by the Dayton accord who oversees the country on behalf of the international community. In practice, this is always someone from the European Union. This complex structure has led to a political stalemate for years; nationalist politicians, especially of Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Croat origin, habitually block political decision-making, which frustrates and stifles Bosnia’s society and economy. The constitution is also discriminatory at its core: if you are Jewish or Sinti, for example, you cannot become the country’s President. The same restriction applies if you do not want to be placed in one of the three ethnic ‘boxes’ (Bosniak, Serbian, Croatian). Consequently many young people see no future and leave the country as soon as they get the chance.

The problem is amplified by foreign interference. During the last elections and the weeks and months leading up to it, Milorad Dodik and others advocating for ethnic nationalism and secession were openly supported by Russia. Last September, the Bosnian-Serb leader Milorad Dodik visited Russia’s President Vladimir Putin: a cordial meeting it was! They agreed, among other things, that Srpska will get preferential access to the Russian gas network. Three other European countries support these extremist politicians too, mainly because they are led by such politicians themselves: Serbia, Croatia and Hungary under prime minister Victor Orban.

All of this means that there is a good chance that Bosnia is entering a new period of stagnation and instability, and that the threat of secession is growing. The dire end result could thus well be: a fragmented, even disintegrated Bosnia, brutal violence and refugee flows. This is totally unwarranted and does not need to happen. It is certainly not the wish of the vast majority of the Bosnian population – not even within Srpska (a hopeful sign): they want stability, economic development and a connection with Europe. No, this stagnation is a direct result of the twisted state structure formed through the Dayton accord, which allows extremist politicians to play their nationalist cards – an agreement actually that was concluded over the heads of the Bosnian population at the time.

Dayton Accord and the role of the High Representative

While the votes were being counted in Bosnia, the High Representative, the German Christian Schmidt, introduced an incomprehensible, irresponsible and indeed reprehensible amendment to the electoral law. This new law strengthens the position of the strongly nationalist Croatian HDZ party – with open support from neighbouring Croatia. This will stimulate nationalist Bosnian Croats in their incitement against the Bosnian unitary state. At the same time, this decision weakens the authority of the High Representative himself.

It should be abundantly clear that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Dayton Agreement will no longer work. The implementation of the agreement is supervised by the so-called Peace Implementation Council (PIC), in which the US, the EU, European countries and Russia are supposed to work together. However, with the war in Ukraine, there is no longer any cooperation to speak of. The High Representative hangs beneath that non-functioning PIC however – and he or she can make decisions independent of PIC, the EU or any other body.

A crucial aspect to consider is the given that the Dayton agreement may not even be legally valid.[3] Not ‘just’ because of its discriminatory character, but also because it legitimises an entity i.e. autonomous state (Srpska) that has committed innumerable brutalities – even genocide, like the mass murder of many thousands of people in and from Srebrenica in the Summer of 1995. The Dayton accord is therefore contrary to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – and arguably even the Geneva Conventions codifying humanitarian law. It would be good to put that issue to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

In summary: 27 years after the war, Bosnia should no longer be saddled with an unworkable state structure. Bosnia is a European country and, like all other countries, has the right to a constitution in which everyone’s vote has an equal value: ‘one man, one woman, one vote’. This principle is crucial in underpinning and protecting all basic rights of all Bosnians, but also crucial in helping to pull Bosnia out of the pit of nationalistic strife and put it on the road to lasting peace and prosperity.

EU holds the keys

Even so, there are plenty of encouraging signs. Not only from the Bosnian voters in early October, most of whom opted in favour of democratic, innovative presidential candidates. But also from the European Union (EU), which holds the vital keys to open the doors to a Bosnia with a future.

Firstly, the High Representative (who has come from a country of the European Union ever since the position was created by the Dayton accord [4]) has the power to fire politicians who do not abide by the Dayton Agreement. Alas, alas: the High Commissioner, currently the German Christian Schmidt, has not made use of this power in recent years – when there has been every reason to.

However, Christian Schmidt has adjusted the structure of the electoral law even more according to ethnicity than it was before. This he actually during the last elections, while the votes were still being counted. The result will be that the nationalist Bosnian-Croat party will become stronger; there is a good chance that the nationalist Croat HDZ will become part of the presidency in new elections. A party that, with the support of Croatia, is lobbying strongly against the Bosnian unitary state. At the same time, this puzzling decision by Schmidt undermines the institution of the High Representative itself. He apparently allows himself to be used by the most nationalist sections of an ethnic group. This High Representative has lost all authority and credibility, and must leave.

What is needed is an new High Representative, who follows a starkly different course: aimed at tackling politicians who preach hatred and sow division. That must be done expeditiously. We must not wait, as in Ukraine, until it is too late with violence erupting in Bosnia, perhaps even descending into full-blown warfare.

Wat is needed from the Dutch government?

It is therefore up to the EU to put Bosnia on the path of stability, peace and a future. The Netherlands can play an important role in this. In recent years, the Netherlands has positioned itself as a friend of Bosnia. It played a vital facilitating role in the arrest and trial of the Bosnian-Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in The Hague. We have given a lot of humanitarian aid as well. But now something more fundamental is needed; a focused effort to turn Bosnia into a truly democratic state that can develop itself positively. Needed are:

1. Press the High Representative in Bosnia to actually fire extremist politicians. There should be no place in Bosnia for politicians who collaborate with authoritarian leaders like Putin and seek to blow up the Bosnian state. We believe that the Dutch government should take much stronger action in this regard. In response to recent parliamentary questions, it has stated that the Netherlands has been pushing for sanctions in the European Council, but that this has come to naught due to opposition from Hungary and Croatia. Still, a majority of the Second Chamber (House of Representatives) of the Dutch parliament is urging further steps. [5] Bosnia apparently still does not have the necessary priority in European capitals. That must change, the Netherlands must put its full weight in Europe, if necessary with Dutch foreign minister Hoekstra and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte, to realise tough sanctions against those ethno-nationalists seeking Bosnia’s demise.

In a broader sense, the Netherlands must take a strong stance in the EU against the two EU countries that are currently frustrating and actively undermining the development of Bosnia: Hungary and Croatia. One must never allow the active undermining of the rule of law by these two countries to plunge Bosnia into the abyss of fragmentation and warfare again.

2. To denounce the High Representative’s decision to amend the electoral law in favour of an ethnic-nationalist party. We believe that this man has shown to be utter unsuitable for this position. The current representative, Christian Schmidt, has shown himself to be utterly unsuitable for this position. We demand that he should make way for someone who can be a truly independent referee and decisionmaker furthering a truly civic Bosnia.
3. Make the – already promised – extra contribution to the EUFOR Althea force. It is of vital importance to strengthen the force back to its original size of 7,000 men. The Netherlands has recently promised to contribute to this increase in manpower. It is crucial that this happens quickly. After all, bad things can happen quite suddenly, such as a declaration of independence by Srpska. Then this Althea force must be ready to quell any violence.
4. Commitment at the International Court of Justice to declare the Dayton Agreement invalid and to take steps towards a new, truly democratic Bosnian constitution based on citizenship regardless of origin and belief, according to the principle of ‘one man, one woman, one vote’.

The situation in Bosnia is complex. But the Netherlands can certainly help to deal with the complexities there, and help prevent or stifle any dangers emanating from these complexities. We have a long and special relationship with Bosnia – also because of the genocide in Srebrenica (where Dutch blue-helmets failed to stop this) during the Bosnian war of 1992-1995. And we have every interest in Bosnia becoming and remaining durably democratic and peaceful. The Netherlands must now make its voice heard in Brussels to give Bosnia the chance for a peaceful and prosperous future.

Caspar ten Dam and Ab de Buck, board members of CHI, have contributed since 1996 to the organisation of the annual commemoration of the fall of Srebrenica on 11^th of July in The Hague. [6]

[1] Ab de Buck & Caspar ten Dam, ‘Bosnian-Serb separatist plans threaten peace in Bosnia – we can still stop this’  CHI, 31 March 2022; Ab de Buck & Caspar ten Dam, ‘Prevent the division of Bosnia by Dodik and Putin – and give it a truly democratic constitution’  CHI, 30 September 2022; see for the online versions www.committeehumanitarianintervention.org (esp. webpage News); or  https://committeehumanitarianintervention.wordpress.com (ibid).

[2] Denis Becirovic and Zejlko Komsic. A Dutch parliamentary delegation led by Attje Kuiken spoke with Zejlko Komsic during a visit in March 2022.

[3] Alden Pervan, The Dayton Peace Agreement: short-term redemption or long-term tragedy?, Open Universiteit (Dutch Open University publication), 2022.

[4] In addition, the EU has an important voice in Dayton’s Peace Implementation Council (PIC) which appoints the High Representative; several EU member states are members of PIC.

[5] In a motion (res. 35 925 V 47), passed on November 23, 2021, the Dutch Second Chamber asks for sanctions against Dodik and his power clique in Srpska. Since then, this has been brought up several times in parliamentary questions by Van der Lee, Sjoerdsma, Kuzu and other parliamentarians.

[6] As board members of the former Political Committee Stari Most (PCSM); see http://starimost.nl (in Dutch).