Caspar ten Dam & Ab de Buck

4 October 2022, Leiden, the Netherlands  

One of our biggest fears earlier this year – as mentioned in our article on Bosnian Serb secession plans in Bosnia [1] – has come true: on February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine. In a previous article [2] we argued for a) massive, coordinated military aid to Ukraine, including long-range weapons; b) allowing Ukraine to retake all Russian-occupied territories; and c) accelerated accession of Ukraine to the European Union after it obtained EU membership candidate status last June. Naturally we have called for maximum humanitarian and economic aid to Ukraine as well – and effective sanctions against Russia, including a total ban on Russian gas purchases; if we get countries like India on board, so much the better. Here we make further proposals on how one could stop and undo Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and how to deal with the nuclear threat and military mobilisation recently proclaimed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. These proposals are as follows:

Military mobilisation in Russia and reception of refugees from Russia

We advocate that the West grant free entry and asylum status to all Russian deserters and conscientious objectors. In our view, this also applies to the Baltic States, which are now making it difficult for Russians to obtain visas. Thus the Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis recently stated that we should not take in these deserters and conscientious objectors because they were not against the war and Russian misdeeds in Ukraine to begin with, but simply are fleeing to save their own skin.[3] But in the end we deem it unethical to admit only the bravest anti-war activists and other dissidents from Russia. There are several considerations for this stance of ours: first, there is every reason to be understanding about the initial denial and unwillingness among many conscientious objectors to face up to the reality of the brutal war and protest against it; secondly, it seems rather presumptuous for us to judge from a safe distance those who (initially) could not muster the courage to protest the war at the risk of their own lives against severe repression; thirdly, fleeing, leaving behind everyone and everything one knows, towards an uncertain future also shows a certain measure of courage; and fourthly, we believe that all people who flee a repressive regime should be given hospitality for the sake of humanity, regardless of the specific motives and circumstances of those who flee. Last but not least, the generous reception of all Russian refugees, including conscientious objectors and deserters, should undermine Putin’ s mobilisation order and his grip on power. In short: all Russians who are at risk from the Putin regime, or who want to flee from his dictatorship and gruesome military service at any case in order to live in safety and freedom, should receive the same generous reception as refugees from Ukraine.

Counter-offensives versus sham referendums in Russian occupied territories

On September 30, Putin announced Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions — after forced, intimidating and manipulated mock referendums in only parts of those regions it still actually occupies. The Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelensky has indicated that it does not care about this and will continue unabated offensives to liberate these areas – even though Putin would regard these as belonging to Russia and thus falling under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. We believe there should be no overt or covert pressure on Zelensky to limit or cease its successful counter-offensives – which fortunately continue to this day, like the liberation of Lyman, a strategic rail hub in the east. Ergo: help Ukraine with additional military aid and intelligence to push through the counter-offensives as quickly and as far as possible, even during the coming winter. With such help it is quite possible that even a large city like Kherson can be liberated in the immediate future. In any case, Ukraine has the right to retake all occupied territories, even if the circumstances make it slow and grinding, and the war would last longer as a result. It is up to Ukraine to determine its priorities and what will be feasible on the battlefield. At the most we can provide her with advice and assistance.

Nuclear threats from Putin

We deem it of vital importance to take this threat seriously, just to be on the safe side, and at the same time not to be blackmailed by it. NATO and/or individual NATO countries must provide adequate conventional and nuclear deterrence against Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The future NATO member states Sweden and Finland already have informal Article 5 protection from the United States and the United Kingdom in particular against both conventional and nuclear aggression by Russia against these countries. We therefore believe that the European Union and the United States should give full support to Ukraine in the event of a nuclear attack. In fact, we believe that Ukraine is now entitled to a publicly stated Article 5 guarantee – preferably from NATO or its member states – against nuclear threats and aggression by Russia. In the conventional field, this is not necessary – Ukraine is clearly able to hold its own on the battlefield. We also deem it wise to immediately send a NATO or EU observation force to Ukraine as an extra deterrent, to show Putin that if he fires one or more nuclear weapons, NATO soldiers or other international observers could be hit by these weapons.

Were Putin to drop one or more nuclear bombs on Ukraine despite such additional deterrence, then the gloves are off regarding military aid to Ukraine. In such an eventuality, NATO and the EU should also help to i) combat nuclear fallout and help its victims; (ii) restore infrastructure as much as possible; and iii) assist Ukrainian troops. In addition, the West and NATO especially should seriously consider the following steps at once:

1. a) maximum sanctions against Russia, including a complete stop of gas imports and access to international payments;
2. b) supplying Ukraine with long-range weapons capable of hitting targets in Russia itself; should one or more nuclear bombs fall on its territory resulting in countless deaths, Ukraine has every right to hit military targets in Russia;
3. c) actively promote the overthrow of the Putin regime; Ukraine – and the West as a whole – has every right to pursue democratic regime change in Russia should the latter actually use nuclear weapons;
4. d) facilitating Ukraine’s ‘fast track’ NATO membership; that country will need extra protection in the future, if only because of the risk that an even more unpredictable dictator could unfortunately come to power after Putin;

Regardless, lasting peace and reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia are highly unlikely as long as Putin remains in power. We hope, however, that a total failure of the Russian invasion will lead to the fall of Putin and his entire regime, and that a new Russian government can then help to secure and guarantee a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Caspar ten Dam and Ab de Buck, board members of CHI, have since 1996 helped to organise the yearly commemoration of the fall of Srebrenica on the 11^th of July in The Hague [4]

[1] Ab de Buck & Caspar ten Dam, ‘Bosnian-Serb separatist plans threaten peace in Bosnia – we can still stop this’, 28 February 2022; see also at alternative website: https://committeehumanitarianintervention.wordpress.com/2022/09/01/how-to-help-ukraine-and-defeat-the-russian-invasion-and-punish-the-aggressor/ (new 31 March 2022 version available in pdf on request).

[2] Caspar ten Dam & Ab de Buck, ‘How to help Ukraine, and defeat the Russian invasion and punish the aggressor’ CHI, 1 September 2022; see also at alternative website: https://committeehumanitarianintervention.wordpress.com/2022/09/01/how-to-help-ukraine-and-defeat-the-russian-invasion-and-punish-the-aggressor/ (new 19 September 2022 available in pdf on request].

[3] See Steven Erlanger, ‘Russians fleeing the draft will not be welcomed in the Baltic States, Lithuania’s foreign minister says’ New York Times Russia-Ukraine War – live updates, 23 Sept. 2022 (updated 28 Sept. 2022); https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/23/world/russia-ukraine-putin-news [russians-fleeing-the-draft-will-not-be-welcomed-in-the-baltic-states-lithuanias-foreign-minister-says].

[4] As boardmembers of the former Political Committee Stari Most (PCSM); see http://starimost.nl.