This declaration is being sent, amongst others, to the Dutch and Belgian ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and to the specialists on these policy-areas  in the Dutch and Belgian parliaments, and to those of the European Parliament.

Honourable Lady/Sir,

We welcome the dismantling and destruction of Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons by mid-2014, jointly undertaken by the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) according to UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (27 September 2013), primarily negotiated by the United States and Russia. We also welcome the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the OPCW for its efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons.

These measures against Syria’s chemical arsenal are the international community’s most significant response to the attack by “surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarin” (UN report, A/67/997-S/2013/553,§28, p.8) on 21 August 2013 against the rebel-held Ghouta area of Damascus, that killed and maimed hundreds of people, mainly civilians (highest estimate, from the US government: 1,429 fatalities, including 426 children).

The armed forces of the regime of Bashar al-Assad almost certainly committed this atrocity, perhaps even on Assad’s direct orders or by anyone from his inner circle. This heinous act is a war crime that particularly violates the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, which came into force in 1997, with the OPCW (est. 1997) tasked to uphold and implement it.

Thus we welcome the warning in UNSC Resolution 2118 that “in the event of non-compliance .., including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter” (§ 21).

Yet we are concerned that any UN-mandated intervention, as a possible measure to ensure international peace and security, would require another UNSC Resolution which easily could be vetoed by Russia, China or any other permanent council-member for reasons which we find questionable or objectionable.

Therefore, we call on you/the [individual minister/parliamentarian/other politician, a/o ministry/parliament/other institution] to support, promote and make sure that:

$11)      A credible threat of force remains in place, with a continuous update of military-scenario planning and a sufficient number of actors willing and ready to carry out an airstrike and/or any other limited yet forceful intervention in Syria – without a UN mandate if need be – if OPCW’s dismantling programme is actively undermined, certainly and above all when there is (danger of) another chemical attack.

$12)      A speedy, decisive intervention by special forces on the ground – if necessary by a preferably mixed i.e. Western-non-Western coalition of the willing if a UN mandate is not forthcoming – to secure any known and preferably all chemical-arms arsenals if the Assad regime or any other actor continues to use chemical weapons despite the limited military strike under option 1). Even if such an intervention is without a UN mandate, it would accord with the spirit of UNSC Resolution 2118, which confirms that “the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a  threat to international peace and security” (§ 1).

$13)      The perpetrators of the August 21 attack and any other chemical attacks in Syria are indicted, arrested and prosecuted for these atrocities – perhaps in conjunction with any other (war) crimes they may have committed – by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and/or a Syrian court after the war, whereby the defendants receive a fair trial and decent treatment before, during and after the trial. UNSC Res. 2118 does state that “those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable” (§ 15). Still, we urge concrete steps to be undertaken as outlined above to make this a reality.

In a sense, by agreeing to the chemical dismantling-and-destruction programme, Assad’s regime does pay a heavy geostrategic price for the August 21 attack. However, OPCW’s dismantling programme, and Assad’s face-saving gesture to join the CWC, is not enough – even if the destruction of 1,000 tonnes of sulphur mustard, VX, sarin and other agents is successful and timely implemented despite the fighting.

Essentially, OPCW’s dismantling programme does not constitute a direct and sufficiently forceful punishment of the perpetrators for the chemical attack, nor a sufficient warning against and discouragement of anyone in or outside Syria contemplating the use of poison gas in the future.

For that reason only, we would have publicly supported the originally planned punitive yet proportionate military strike against targets directly and indirectly related to Syria’s chemical-weapons capability – by a coalition of the willing led by the United States, France, and possibly other countries from the region (admittedly small, clearly due to a debilitating interpretation of the ill-fated US-led Iraq occupation).

We would still call for such a military strike if Assad’s regime wilfully delays, frustrates or undermines OPCW’s dismantling-and-destruction programme, as described in option 1). Such a strike may then be different – perhaps more limited – in its targets, scope and duration from the one originally planned by the US, France and other nations, particularly if civilians would not be in direct danger of another chemical attack. The only other true alternative are extra, credible and far-reaching economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime and its leading members.

We would certainly call for a military strike to prevent, stop or punish any other chemical attack in Syria, even if no UNSC resolution directly authorises it (option 2) ). ICHI is primarily established to “call .. for humanitarian intervention in the judicial sense: military intervention to prevent, halt or curtail genocide, crimes against humanity and/or war crimes without a UN mandate” (basic declaration ICHI).

Finally, we also call for conditional military support to the most credible and moderate i.e. tolerant and democratic Syrian political and military opposition forces, whether in or outside the embattled Syrian National Coalition and (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the primary conditions being i) respect for humanitarian and human rights law by their combatants, and ii) effective discouragement and proportional punishment of any (incident) violations by their own combatants.

Such conditions are necessary both in the moral and practical sense, as rebel forces unfortunately do commit atrocities as well, like the massacre of 190 civilians in villages near Latakia during an offensive in August  (Human Rights Watch, “You Can Still See Their Blood”, October 2013); these villagers were mainly heterodox-Shiite Alawi who support Assad’s regime if only out of fear what might happen if the primarily Sunni rebels win the war – such atrocities only help to solidify and justify these fears.

If actual genocide, i.e. large-scale killings intended and geared towards the extermination of an entire people (thus even worse than the killings until now), is looming, we call for a humanitarian intervention on the ground, by a coalition of the willing if there is no UN authorisation, that would be much wider in scope than the one described under option 2) above.

These two issues – conditional support to (some) Syrian rebels, and large-scale intervention to prevent, stop or at least counteract actual genocide – are addressed more extensively in another declaration, which will appear soon [and will be sent to you/your organisation as well]. Hopefully, you would consider and support our calls and proposals of military intervention if required, and help to realize these in practice.

With the highest regard,

Caspar ten Dam, chairperson ICHI

With: Bas Wallage, spokesperson ICHI                           NB: See the Appendix for additional arguments

APPENDIX – Additional Arguments

Some might object to ICHI’s stance on Syria, arguing that it a) “isn’t absolutely certain” who the perpetrators of the August 21 attack – and any of the earlier, smaller chemical strikes – are, and b) that “it would be absurd to intervene only because of that chemical attack, while over 100,000 people have been killed by non-chemical but equally atrocious violence in the civil war since it began in 2011 – a war that has led to millions of internally displaced people, and millions of refugees outside the country”. Let us deal with each of these arguments in turn.

Regarding culpability

True, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that rebel forces have carried out (some of) the chemical strikes. This may be particularly true of foreign Islamist groups with direct ties to Al-Qaeda (the Base) but with no direct ties to the local communities, like those of or within the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Al-Sham, the Levant) or ISIS. The other major Islamist movement, the Al-Nusra Front, seems to consist of more domestic Syrian fighters. Still, their involvement in chemical warfare is improbable, because:

$1a)      Practically all targeted areas were in rebel control, and most of those are peopled by communities who support or even have family and kinship ties to the rebels in the area. It is morally and pragmatically inconceivable that rebels would target their own people (and families) just to lay the blame on the enemy – the risk of discovery would just be too great; they would be lynched by their own people and their cause irretrievably lost (thus allegations that the Bosnian government shelled its own people in Sarajevo during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war are equally absurd).

$1b)      Even if particularly foreign Jihadists perpetrated some of the chemical attacks, it is highly unlikely that they possess the capacity and the amount of chemical agents to mount a large-scale attack as the one on August 21^st.

$1c)      There are no reliable reports and factual indications at present that any of the Syrian rebel groups perpetrated any of the chemical attacks during the conflict.

Regarding chemical weapons

True, tens of thousands of people, primarily civilians, have been killed in the Syrian conflict by non-chemical weapons. Many opponents of US President Barack Obama’s “red line” against Syria’s regime on the use of chemical weapons in the conflict and/or Obama’s reluctant and aborted plan of a military strike in response to the August 21 attack, argue that military intervention in Syria should have been undertaken much earlier to halt the massive atrocities there (others, pacifists, isolationists and many so-called realists, oppose any such intervention anyway). They also argue that chemical weapons are not so unique or uniquely horrible that intervention should only happen when these weapons are used.

We generally agree with these arguments, but not in the way opponents to Obama’s half-hearted interventionism use them. For us, these arguments are no valid reasons not to intervene against chemical-weapons use, simply because no intervention has occurred against brutal other-weapons use.

More to the point, chemical and biological weapons are uniquely horrible, because poison gasses and other chemical and biological agents are automatically, by their very nature, painful, harmful and potentially lethal to anyone being deliberately targeted and exposed to these agents. Once released, any people coming into contact with those chemical agents will feel pain, will get hurt, will get maimed (skin burns, burnt lungs, etcetera) and will probably die a painful death or at best survive with long-term or permanent  physical and mental damage.

In contrast, most conventional weapons do not automatically i.e. universally have such inevitably painful and maiming effects. One can always dodge a bullet or even a grenade or rocket; and even if one is hit, one may be wounded lightly – a bullet grazes your skin, or you get a temporary concussion from a grenade or rocket exploding nearby. Many conventional wounds are even relatively painless – certainly when compared with the pain arising from poison gasses and other chemical or biological agents – or will be painful only for a short while, or the received wounds will heal well, with only scars showing.

Apart from defenceless people being deliberately targeted, conventional warfare normally leads to surprisingly low casualty rates among combatants, even on hotly contested battlefields. The primary exception is trench warfare like the one in WWI, when lightly-armed soldiers get out of the trenches and charge over open terrain against heavily fortified positions with machineguns and other heavy weaponry. Yet such charges are risky, often stupid tactics that fortunately rarely occur in present-day warfare.

In contrast, chemical weapons only lead to few casualties due to happy circumstances like changing wind and other weather conditions; in other words, a low body-count in any chemical attack relies on luck –

even more so than a biological attack, which is less susceptible to changing atmospheric conditions.

True, their unreliability and unpredictability under changing (weather) conditions, make chemical weapons generally unpopular and rarely used – if only because the poison gasses might blow back in the face of the attacker. However, whenever conditions remain favourable to the chemical attacker, the recipients of the attack will almost certainly be killed and horribly maimed in droves – and painfully so.

Last but not least, any fighter or civilians might surrender to the person pointing a gun to them, even if the latter had been firing before. And the latter can (hopefully) accept the surrender, and treat the surrendered person decently. However, once a chemical or biological agent is released, its victims cannot simply escape or stop it by ‘surrendering’ to the perpetrator.

The poisonous gas, virus or other toxic is already in the air, on their skin, in their lungs. Unless one theoretically releases an anti-dote that works quickly and effectively, the horrible pantomime of the toxic attack plays itself out to its dreadful finale.

For all these reasons, chemical – and biological – weapons are uniquely painful and destructive to the human body and spirit. These reasons, in essence, explain – and should make it self-evident – why so many treaties and conventions outlaw such weapons, like the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva, signed 17 June 1925), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

These reasons should also explain why no responsible and militarily capable nation can avoid – let alone frustrate and sabotage – a forceful intervention against active violators of these chemical-weapons treaties and conventions. True, they should have intervened before in Syria to stop ‘conventional’ massacres anyway, but now they simply have to stop and prevent chemical massacres, because of the uniquely, inherently horrific nature of chemical weapons. Actually, poison gasses and other toxic agents are not really weapons i.e. instruments of – hopefully proportional – force: rather, these are instruments of torture.

Other toxics and burning agents with kindred effects on deliberately targeted victims should be banned as well, such as Napalm and other poisons used in explosives, and fuel-air explosive bombs – like the ones dropped by the Syrian Air Force on a secondary school in the rebel-held town of Raqqa on 29 September, killing at least fourteen civilians (HRW, ‘Powerful Conventional Weapon Kills at Least 12 Students in Raqqa’, 1 October 2013). To us, it is decidedly odd, indeed absurd and immoral, that such incendiary and other burning devices are not classified as chemical weapons, or banned as equally horrible weapons.

Essentially the same can be said of nuclear weapons – but nuclear bombs are, incredibly yet unsurprisingly, not outlawed in production and use in current international law. Actually, almost all so-called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e. massive deliveries of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN), are rather – even when used on a small scale – Weapons of Extreme Suffering and Pain (WESP; ‘wesp’: Dutch word for wasp – but its sting it hardly reflects the real pain).

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ICHI email: ichuminterv@aim.com  ICHI website: https://committeehumanitarianintervention.org

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