The Student Society of International Relations and International Organisation (‘IB/IO’) at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands (www.clio.nl).

Time & Location: Huis de Beurs, A-Kerkhof Zuid Zijde (South Side) 4, Groningen, Netherlands, from 19:15 till 22:15 hours (www.huisdebeurs.nl).

With a showing of the documentary ‘Afghanistan: Land of Wonders’ (after twenty years, Soviet veterans look back on their war in Afghanistan)by Kim Taminiau, Johan Zielstra and Jorrit Kamminga

Followed by a debate chaired by Prof. dr. Jaap de Wilde, Internationale Relations and Powerpolitics at the University of Groningen, theNetherlands, with amongst others the following speakers:

Mr. Ehsan Turabaz, Honorary Consul of Afganistan in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and President of the ‘Netherlands-Afhanistan Business Council’.

Dr. Hans van Koningsbrugge, director Netherlands-Russia Centre.

Drs. Dick P. Scherjon, section Knowhow and Economic Research at Rabobank Netherlands, and member of working group Economic Reconstruction Afghanistan; reserve Colonel of the Dutch Royal Army.

NB: General-Major Mart de Kruif, till 1 November 2009 ISAD-commander in Southern-Afganistan over 40,000 troops from sixteen countries, had to cancel his attendance.
After the debate, ICHI-chairman Caspar ten Dam spoke with Hans van Koningsbrugge, Jaap de Wilde, Jorrit Kamminga, en some people from the audience.

He put to them as ‘food for further thought’ the following fundamental questions, that according to him must be answered first before one can ever develop a succesful long-term strategy for Afghanistan:

Why do the current Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai, and the political movements that since 2001 have largely come from the Northern Alliance, need foreign military support to survive?

Why would the Taliban come back to power if the foreign troops would leave now?

In short, why are the Taliban and its allies much stronger than their enemies? Do the former have more support among the people after all, especially among the Pashtuns? Or does it largely rely on support from the Pakistani madrasas (Islamic schools) and the Pakistani secret service?

How can one break or otherwise overcome these ‘powersources’? Implication: as long as the Afghan government cannot survive on its own, and the Taliban can do so or in much higher degree, the missions of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the American operation Enduring Freedom seem doomed to failure – despite the pending deployment of an extra 30,000 American troops, as President Barack Obama has decided upon.

At best this means an open-ended commitment in Afghanistan, and a war of attrition against the Taliban without an assured outcome.

Is it wise to operate as foreigners so ‘heavy-handedly’ in Afghanistan, and make all kinds of demands on the Afghan government and society, such as fighting corruption and the training of Afghan military and police according to Western models and criteria? Is the basic attitude not much too condescending, even neo-colonial, an attitude with averse effects – like the widespread aversion against the ‘occupation’ among so many Afghans? Would a modest, ‘light touch’ approach not be much better, by which the Afghans themselves can indicate what kind of international support they wish and deem necessary?

Thus military and civilian training programmes must not be imposed from the outside, but rather formed on the basis of the requests, preferences and traditions of the Afghans themselves.

How can one avoid to operate for long periods in a country, even occupy it, so as to safeguard the local population and/or international security, without leading to dependencies in the local government and society on foreign aid, and without getting trapped into a ‘never-ending’ war against those who (would) threaten the population and/or international security – or against those who, feeling humiliated by the foreign presence, resist out of tribal and/or national(istic) pride?

The International Comittee for Humanitarian Intervention (ICHI) leans toward humanitarian interventions solely focused on the prevention or halting of the worst atrocities, with speedy exit-strategies so as to avoid creating neo-colonial dependency relations. Such an approach may easily lead to the logistical nightmare of intervening over and over again in certain countries, and may also undermine long-term reconstruction and ‘nation-building’ projects. ICHI shall further develop its views on this difficult issue.